Abstract. Glivenko's theorem states that an arbitrary propositional formula is classically provable if and only if its double negation is intuitionistically provable. The result does not extend to full first-order predicate logic, but does extend to first-order predicate logic without the universal quantifier. A recent paper by Zdanowski shows that Glivenko's theorem also holds for secondorder propositional logic without the universal quantifier. We prove that Glivenko's theorem extends to some versions of simple type theory without the universal quantifier. Moreover we prove that Kuroda's negative translation, which is known to embed classical first-order logic into intuitionistic first-order logic, extends to the same versions of simple type theory. We also prove that the Glivenko property fails for simple type theory once a weak form of functional extensionality is included.
Introduction
Glivenko's theorem states that an arbitrary propositional formula s is classically provable if and only if ¬¬s is intuitionistically provable [8] . Glivenko's theorem does not extend to first-order predicate logic, but does extend to first-order predicate logic without ∀ quantifiers [11] . A recent paper by Zdanowski [15] shows that Glivenko's theorem also holds for second-order propositional logic without the ∀ quantifier. In this paper we consider how Glivenko's result extends to simple type theories in the style of Church [4] . Such simple type theories are also referred to as higher-order logics.
A related result by Kuroda states that a first-order formula s is classically provable if and only if ¬¬s ′ is intuitionistically provable, where s ′ is obtained from s by adding double negations beneath each universal quantifier. The mapping from s to ¬¬s ′ is known as the Kuroda negative translation [11] . The Kuroda negative translation embeds classical first-order logic into intuitionistic first-order logic. Kuroda's translation extends in a natural way to higher-order formulas. We determine This is a technical report version of a paper submitted in December 2011.
when this extension embeds the classical version of a simple type theory into the corresponding intuitionistic version.
There are other logical transformations that translate classical firstorder logic into intuitionistic first-order logic including the Kolmogorov negative translation [10] and the Gödel-Gentzen negative translation [7, 9] . Unlike the Kuroda negative translation, the Kolmogorov and the Gödel-Gentzen negative translations do not extend in a natural way to higher-order logic. In both cases, propositional atoms are not mapped to themselves but to their double negations. In higher order logic a propositional atom may be a variable. If a translation adds a double negation to such variables, then the translation will not respect β-equivalence.
For the first part of the paper we consider simple type theory without extensionality. We prove the Glivenko and Kuroda results extend to the non-extensional case. We then consider simple type theory with the possible addition of three forms of extensionality: propositional extensionality, η-extensionality and ξ-extensionality. It turns out that the Glivenko and Kuroda results continue to hold if we include either propositional extensionality or η-extensionality (or both). Note that this implies the ∀ quantifier cannot be defined from the other logical constants in the intuitionistic versions of simple type theory without ξ-extensionality. On the other hand, it is well-known that all the logical constants (including ∀) can be defined from equality if one has all three forms of extensionality (see [2, 12] ). Consequently, the Glivenko result fails in the presence of all three forms of extensionality. In fact, we prove the Glivenko result fails in each of the versions of simple type theory with ξ-extensionality. To summarize, the Glivenko property holds for simple type theory without ∀ and without ξ-extensionality, but does not hold for simple type theory with ∀ or with ξ-extensionality. Furthermore, the Kuroda translation preserves provability for simple type theory without ξ-extensionality, but not for simple type theory with ξ-extensionality.
In Section 2 we give a short presentation of simply typed λ-calculus. In Section 3 we present natural deduction calculi for a few variants of simple type theory. We prove the Kuroda and Glivenko results in Section 4. In Section 5 we consider what happens when extensionality principles are included.
Simply typed lambda calculus
We describe simply typed λ-calculus in the style of Church [4] . The set of types is given inductively: o and ι are types and στ is a type whenever σ and τ are types. The types o (the type of propositions) and ι (the type of individuals) are called base types. Types of the form στ are called function types. We use σ and τ to range over types.
For each type σ, let N σ be an infinite set of names of type σ. Some of the names are logical constants:
• ⊥ is a logical constant in N o .
• ∧, ∨ and → are (distinct) logical constants in N ooo .
• For each σ, = σ is a logical constant in N σσo .
• For each σ, ∀ σ and ∃ σ are (distinct) logical constants in N (σo)o . The remaining names are variables . Let C σ be the set of logical constants of type σ and V σ be the (infinite) set of all variables of type σ.
For any C ′ ⊆ C we define a family of sets of terms Λ C ′ σ for each type σ by induction.
• For every
We defined Λ We write ¬s for ((→ s)⊥). We write stu for (st)u, except that ¬st means ¬(st). We use the infix notation s ∧ t, s ∨ t, s → t and s = σ t as shorthand for ∧st, ∨st, → st and = σ st, respectively. Note that ¬s is s → ⊥. We write ∀x : σ.s and ∃x : σ.s for ∀ σ (λx.s) and ∃ σ (λx.s), respectively. We may also omit the type entirely from a quantified formula or equation and write ∀x.s, ∃x.s or s = t when the types are clear in context.
When s is a term, w ∈ N σ and t is a term of type σ, then s w t is defined to be the result of substituting t for w in s via a captureavoiding substitution. A term of the form (λx.s)t is called a β-redex with β-reduct s x t . We say s β-reduces to t (and write s → β t) if a subterm of s is a β-redex such that t is the result of replacing this subterm by its β-reduct. We define s ∼ β t to be the least equivalence relation containing → β . When s ∼ β t holds, we say s and t are β-equivalent.
Natural deduction calculi
By a simple type theory we mean simply typed λ-terms with a notion of provability. Another phrase used in the literature for such a language and notion of provability is higher-order logic. In this section we define three notions of provability via natural deduction: classical non-extensional simple type theory (sometimes called elementary type theory [1] ), classical non-extensional simple type theory without ∀, and intuitionistic non-extensional simple type theory. All the natural deduction rules we will need to define these calculi are given in Figure 1 .
• Γ ⊢ K s (where Γ is a finite subset of Λ o and s ∈ Λ o ) holds when derivable using all the rules in Figure 1 . • Γ ⊢ J s (where Γ is a finite subset of Λ o and s ∈ Λ o ) holds when derivable using all the rules in Figure 1 except N c .
Glivenko and Kuroda for non-extensional simple type theory
We prove Glivenko's theorem extends to non-extensional simple type theory without the ∀ quantifier. Extensionality is handled separately in the next section. Furthermore, we provide a translation from classical simple type theory into intuitionistic simple type theory (see [13] ). This translation turns out to be an extension of Kuroda's negative translation to simple type theory. Finally, we give an example illustrating Glivenko does not extend to full simple type theory (with ∀). This is not surprising since it does not extend to full first-order logic either.
We first discuss whether the Kolmogorov and the Gödel-Gentzen negative translations extend to higher-order logic. Assume that when a translation Ψ is extended to higher-order logic it translates Ψ(st) as Ψ(s)Ψ(t) and Ψ(λx.s) as λx.Ψ(s). In other words, assume the translation is compositional with respect to application and λ-abstraction. Under this assumption, there is no β-respecting extension of the Kolmogorov and the Gödel-Gentzen negative translations to higher-order logic. We provide an example showing that they do not respect β-equivalence. Let p be a variable of type o. The result of translating Figure 1 . Natural deduction rules p using either of the translations is ¬¬p [5] . Consider the two β-equivalent terms (λp.p)p and p. The translations of these two terms are (λp.¬¬p)(¬¬p) and ¬¬p, respectively. The resulting terms are not β-equivalent. The reason for this is that the translations double negate the atoms in a formula. We now introduce a lemma which provides some helpful formulas that we will make use of later on. (
We prove that if a higher-order formula s with no ∀ quantifiers is classically provable using the rules in ⊢ − K then ¬¬s is intuitionistically provable using the rules in ⊢ J .
We now define a translation Φ from general higher-order formulas to formulas not containing ∀ quantifiers. We call Φ compositional since it respects application and λ-abstraction. For Γ ⊆ Λ we write Φ(Γ) to mean {Φ(t)|t ∈ Γ}.
Note that ¬∃x.¬px is intuitionistically equivalent to ∀x.¬¬px. Therefore, the translation taking a formula s to ¬¬Φ(s) is equivalent to Kuroda's negative translation [11] in the sense of the equivalence defined in [5] .
We now prove that if a general higher-order formula s is classically provable using the rules in ⊢ K , then its translation Φ(s) which does not have ∀ quantifiers is provable using the rules in ⊢
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ K s. We consider the interesting cases where the derivation ends with the N We now prove that the following does not hold: For all finite Γ ⊆ Λ o and s ∈ Λ o , Γ ⊢ K s implies Γ ⊢ J ¬¬s. We prove it does not hold by giving a formula s for which Γ ⊢ K s and Γ ⊢ J ¬¬s. Namely, we consider the formula ∀x.f x ∨ ¬f x where f is a variable of type ιo and x is a variable of type ι.
Lemma 4.7. Let f be a variable of type ιo and x be a variable of type ι.
Proof. Note that ¬¬∀x.f x ∨ ¬f x is a first-order formula. A first-order Kripke counter-model is given in Chapter 4 of [6] . In category theoretic terms, the counter-model is given by interpreting ι as a presheaf I over ω (ordered by ≤) where In := {1, . . . , n + 1} and f is interpreted as the presheaf f n := {1, . . . , n} (both with the obvious inclusion maps). Since every presheaf category is a topos and hence a model of intuitionistic higher-order logic (see [12] ), we also know ⊢ J ¬¬∀x.f x ∨ ¬f x. Proof. Let f be a variable of type ιo and x be a variable of type ι. The statement ⊢ K ∀x.f x ∨ ¬f x is easily derivable using the N c rule. By Lemma 4.7 we know ⊢ J ¬¬∀x.f x ∨ ¬f x.
Extensionality
There are different extensionality properties one may or may not include in simple type theory. Four such properties are explored in [3] . We briefly review these properties.
η: η-extensionality is the property that every element of a function type is a λ-abstraction. The property can be expressed as a set of formulas ∀f : στ.f = στ λx.f x where σ, τ range over types. An equivalent formulation is to use η-conversion. If x is not free in s, then the term λx.sx is called an η-redex with η-reduct s. We say s η-reduces to t (and write s → η t) if a subterm of s is an η-redex such that t is the result of replacing this subterm by its η-reduct. We define s ∼ η t to be the least equivalence relation containing → η .
ξ: ξ-extensionality is the property that two λ-abstractions are equal if their bodies always have the same value. The property can be expressed as a set of formulas ∀f : στ.∀g : στ.(∀x : σ.f x = τ gx) → (λx.f x) = στ (λx.gx) where σ, τ range over types.
f: Functional extensionality is the property that two functions are equal if they are equal on all arguments. The property can be expressed as a set of formulas ∀f : στ.∀g : στ.(∀x : σ.f x = τ gx) → f = στ g where σ, τ range over types.
b: Boolean extensionality is the property that there are only two elements of type o.
In this paper we also consider a fifth form of extensionality. p: Propositional extensionality is the property that two elements of type o are equal if they are equivalent. The property can be expressed as the formula ∀p :
In a classical setting, Boolean extensionality and propositional extensionality are equivalent. Hence we can use b and p interchangeably for classical simple type theory. In particular, in all the results of [3] b can be replaced by p. Furthermore, the assumption of Boolean extensionality in the intuitionistic setting forces the logic to be classical. Since our goal is to relate the intuitionistic and classical versions of simple type theory, only propositional extensionality will be considered in this paper. Figure 2 . Extensionality rules
In [3] it is proven that functional extensionality is exactly the combination of η-extensionality and ξ-extensionality. Thus there are eight versions of classical simple type theory relative to extensionality principles. In [3] the eight possibilities are named using the indexes β, βη, βξ, βf, βp, βηp, βξp and βfp (except b was used instead of p). For each * ∈ {β, βη, βξ, βf, βp, βηp, βξp, βfp} an appropriate class of models M * is defined and a corresponding (sound and complete) classical natural deduction calculus NK * is given in [3] . In the context of the present paper, we can obtain such natural deduction calculi by adding some or all of the additional extensionality rules given in Figure 2 . We can also define an intuitionistic natural deduction calculus for each * in the same way. Each of these defines a variant of simple type theory.
• Γ ⊢ * K s (where Γ is a finite subset of Λ o and s ∈ Λ o ) holds when derivable using all the rules in Figure 1 • Γ ⊢ * J s (where Γ is a finite subset of Λ o and s ∈ Λ o ) holds when derivable using the rules in Figure 2 indicated by * and all the rules in Figure 1 except N c .
We now prove that each case without ξ-extensionality satisfies the Kuroda and Glivenko properties. This implies the universal quantifier cannot be defined from the other logical constants in simple type theory without ξ-extensionality. Clearly we have Γ, ⊤ = (f x ∨ ¬f x) ⊢ *
Conclusion
We have proven that the Glivenko result (for formulas without ∀) and the Kuroda translation extend to simple type theory without ξ-extensionality. As a consequence, ∀ is not definable from the other logical constants in the absence of ξ-extensionality. Also, we have proven that the results do not extend to simple type theory once ξ-extensionality is included.
